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Abstract. The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not
necessarily re°ect the majority of the whole population since voters can ab-
stain. This paper shows that a quorum exists for which the outcome of the
referendum coincides with the population preference. However, a second equi-
librium can exist in which the proposal is always rejected. When insu±cient
information makes the optimal quorum unknown, it is in general more harmful
to set the quorum too high than too low. Robustness of the results is analyzed
by allowing pressure groups to encourage or discourage participation after the
quorum is set.
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1. Introduction
In June 2005 a referendum was held in Italy to block a fertility law. The law banned
research using stem cells from embryos and imposed stringent requirements on test-tube
pregnancies. Adversaries of the law initiated the referendum to aim for its abrogation. To
succeed, a quorum of 50% was to be met and a majority of the participating voters had
to support the abrogation. This gave advocates of the law two di®erent possibilities to
avoid abrogation: i) encouraging no-voters to take the e®ort to vote so that they would
form the majority; ii) discouraging no-voters from voting so that the quorum would not
be met and the referendum would be invalid. In Italy, the advocates of the law chose for
the second option, for example the speakers of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies as
well as the Roman Church discouraged people from voting. The New York Times (2005)
writes that \Italian prelates have told parishioners to head to the beach instead of the
polling places on Sunday and Monday, so that the quorum will not be met." The strategy
succeeded, the turnout was too low and the referendum was invalid. Since 26% of the
population voted, while almost 90% of the participating voters were in favor, 23.4% of the
population was in favor and voted. When a handful of people in favor was discouraged
by the forecasts of an invalid referendum, encouraging no-voters to cast their ballot could
indeed have led to a valid referendum in which the abrogation would have been approved.
Referenda are becoming increasingly widespread in democratic countries (Waters (2003)
and Matsusaka (2005) discuss recent trends, see also the web sites of The Initiative & Ref-
erendum Institute). One of the main reasons is the wish to give voters a direct say in the
issues at stake. An additional reason might be that direct democracy would contribute to
voters' involvement with and trust in the political system. However, referenda are known
to be imperfect decision making tools in the sense that a counter-intuitive relationship
between the voters' preferences and the outcome can occur. Nurmi (1998) lists various
voting paradoxes, including problems stemming from multiple proposals or multiple al-
ternatives and the possibility of con°icting opinions between the majorities of the voters
and their representatives. As the referendum in Italy shows, a quorum gives rise to an
additional potential problem by giving opponents of change an additional tool to reach
their aim. Fishburn and Brahms (1983) call this the \no-show" paradox.
The objective of this paper is twofold. In the ¯rst part we address the question whether
there is any theoretical support for imposing a quorum in a referendum. The focus of
the second part is on the robustness of the results. More speci¯cally, we ¯rst look at the
magnitude of the distortion when the quorum is set either too low or too high and then at
the impact of pressure groups which can a®ect the voter turnout after the quorum is set.
The role of the quorum is analyzed in a stylized referendum model with heterogenous
voters. The existence of a quorum makes the turnout a decisive variable for determining
the outcome. But even for referenda without a quorum, the voting/not-voting decision isFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 3
an important aspect of explaining the outcome. Analyzing this decision usually leads to
the conclusion that people who vote do not form a representative subset of the population.
For example, Fort and Bunn (1998) ¯nd for referenda concerning nuclear power that actual
participation has more explanatory power for the yes/no decision than both economic and
preference variables. Successfully navigating the hurdles of registering, going to the booth
etc. made a no-vote more likely. In the model, this asymmetry between opponents and
proponents is re°ected by their possibly di®erent probabilities of voting.
In the ¯rst part of the paper we show that with the appropriate choice of the quorum
and the default outcome that occurs if the quorum is not met, the population majority
outcome can be attained. To see how the referendum should be designed, suppose that
proponents are more likely to cast their ballots then opponents. In order to o®set the bias
towards accepting, the default outcome needs to be rejection. A higher quorum needs
more participating voters. To be precise, it needs a higher fraction of yes-voters in the
population since they are more likely to vote. A higher quorum thus reduces the cases
where the majority of participating voters is in favor while the majority of the population
is not. The population majority outcome is attained for the quorum for which they equal.
Interestingly, when voters care more about the outcome when they are participating,
the optimal quorum does not necessarily lead to the population majority outcome. A
second equilibrium can exist in which the default outcome always occurs. In this case, the
referendum clearly is an imperfect tool for decision making.
The second part of the paper analyzes the robustness of the results in two ways. When
the social planner has insu±cient knowledge about the population parameters or insuf-
¯cient political power to set the quorum at its optimal level, a non-optimal quorum can
arise. When the default outcome is set correctly, we show that setting the quorum too
low is less harmful than setting it too high. The reason is that the default outcome will
always occur when the quorum is too high, while when the quorum is too low both out-
comes might still occur. Since in most real-life applications there is not much °exibility
in setting the quorum, this ¯nding implicates that only topics for which both sides have a
high expected turnout should be subjected to referenda. A non-optimal quorum can also
arise when pressure groups have the possibility to a®ect the turnout after the quorum is
set, like in the Italian referendum discussed above. When the default outcome is rejecting
the proposal, yes-pressure groups should always encourage people to vote. For no-pressure
groups it is optimal to encourage voters to participate only if it is likely that there are
relatively many no-voters, otherwise they should be discouraged from voting.
Since the basis of democracy is that all people are equally important, we consider
the preference of the population majority as the benchmark outcome. We thus abstain
from social welfare considerations that balance an \optimal outcome" with the cost of
representation. The model can easily be adapted to address di®erent intensities of voters'FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 4
preferences. In case a quorum is exogenously imposed to guarantee a certain level of
representativeness, the second part of the paper can be read as analyzing the di®erence
between the referendum outcome and the population majority outcome. We assume that
participation is voluntary, as compulsory voting would trivially result in the population
majority outcome (however, Franklin (1999) and Jakee and Sun (2006) raise arguments
against compulsory voting).
Theoretical support for the importance of the population majority outcome follows from
the axiomatization of May (1952) as the only voting rule that is decisive, anonymous, not-
favoring any of the outcomes and positively responding (i.e. when one voter changes
opinion then the group decision becomes more favorable towards that opinion). However,
when voters can abstain from participating, C^ orte-Real and Pereira (2004) ¯nd that in
general no voting rule that is independent of the abstainers' preferences can achieve the
population majority outcome. They show that this outcome can be achieved if in the case
of a turnout below the quorum, the underlying reasons determine the outcome. In the
equilibrium setting of this paper's model, this interpretation of an insu±cient turnout is
done ex ante when the referendum is designed.
The model is based on the decision-theoretic approach initiated by Downs (1957). Voters
participate in the referendum when they receive a positive net utility from voting. Follow-
ing Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and in line with empirical evidence discussed extensively
by Blais (2000), the net utility of voting depends on the outcome of the referendum, the
cost of casting the ballot and a \consumption bene¯t" that represents the ful¯llment of
a voter's \civic duty". The main di®erence between their and our model is how a voter
derives utility from the outcome of the referendum and from participating. In their model,
they consider the benchmark of a utility function that is linear in the outcome of the ref-
erendum. However, there might be nonlinearities involved with respect to the outcome
and participation. More speci¯cally, the utility of the referendum outcome might depend
on whether a voter has participated or not. On top of this, when there are many potential
voters, the probability that a particular voter's action is decisive is almost zero. Myerson
(2000) derives estimates of the order 10¡9. Hence, unless the utility di®erence between
the outcomes is extremely large relative to the cost of voting, the nonlinear e®ect might
be far more important. It is not clear what the direction of this nonlinear e®ect should be:
there are convincing arguments for all possibilities. When it is zero the outcome of the
referendum does not a®ect a voter's participation decision. When it is negative, a voter
exhibits an underdog-mentality: the less likely her preferred outcome, the more likely she
will vote. When the nonlinear e®ect is positive, a voter likes to be part of the winning
side. In this paper we consider all types. Moreover, we show that if all types can occur
simultaneously, the average type drives the results.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 5
Although the literature on voting is vast, there are few papers on referenda. Herrera and
Mattozzi (2007) discuss a group-based referendum model. As in this paper, the turnout
of each group is endogenous. However, instead of having the referendum outcome directly
a®ecting the voters' utility, their groups weigh the cost of increasing the turnout with its
e®ect on the referendum outcome. They ¯nd a \quorum paradox": the equilibrium turnout
might only exceed the quorum if the quorum is not imposed. Myatt (2007) discusses a
model in which a ¯nite number of privately informed voters have to chose between two
alternatives that are preferred to the status quo. In contrast with the model of this paper,
strategic voting can occur when a voter fears that her most preferred alternative will not
receive su±cient support. Marquette and Hinckley (1988) and Kanazawa (1998) suggest
that a voter's recall of previous elections is also relevant for current turnout. Closely
related to the model of this paper, Kanazawa (1998) proposes to substitute the Riker-
Ordeshook probability regarding the current election with the probability that the voter's
preferred outcome occurred when she participated in past elections. Hence, instead of
computing the probability that her preferred candidate wins as in this paper's model, a
voter uses an estimation based on past experience.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 shows
that there is a quorum for which the population majority outcome can occur and analyzes
its properties, Section 4 addresses the robustness of the results by considering a not-
optimally set quorum and allowing for pressures groups. Appendices A and B contain
precise formulations of claims made in the main text. Proofs are deferred to Appendix C.
2. The Referendum Model
2.1. The Referendum. A referendum is held in order to decide whether a proposal
should be accepted or rejected. Each voter has three options: i) to vote in favor of the
proposal; ii) to vote against it; iii) not to vote. Voters who do indeed vote are called
participating voters. The referendum is only valid if a quorum is met, that is if more than
a certain fraction of the voters is indeed voting. The proposal is accepted if the referendum
is valid and if the majority of the participating voters is in favor.1 When the quorum is
met but a majority of the participating voters is against, the proposal is rejected. In case
the referendum is invalid, a preset default outcome determines whether the proposal is
accepted or not. Although in some real-life referenda the default outcome is not explicitly
set, in most cases it is rather clear what will happen when the referendum is not valid.
For example, in the referendum about the European Constitution in the Netherlands there
was no formal default outcome. Though, all major political parties were in favor and it
was clear that the European Constitution would be accepted in case the quorum would
1When the intensities of the voters' preferences di®er, a quali¯ed majority can be used to protect a
minority from the majority, see Appendix A for details.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 6
not be met. In this paper, designing a referendum is thus choosing the quorum and default
option.
There is a continuum of voters with measure one. Each voter knows whether she is in
favor of the proposal or against it, but there is uncertainty about the overall fraction of
voters in favor of the topic.2 The assumption that the preferences of voters are endoge-
nously determined is rather standard. However, Rosema (2004) discusses the psychology
of voting and ¯nds that possible election outcomes are used in the decision what to vote.
Making voters' preferences endogenous though, justi¯es research on its own and is outside
the scope of this paper. Hence, denote by y the proportion of voters in favor of the pro-
posal. The very reason that a referendum is needed, is that the value of y is unknown.
Hence, y is a random variable which takes its values in an interval [y;y] ½ [0;1]. The
distribution of y is common knowledge. This can be the case if for example forecasting
agencies provide correct projections when not everyone has made up her mind yet. The
proportion of voters in favor has full support on [y;y]. The model is not relevant when
the majority is either always in favor or always against, so it is assumed that y < 1
2 < y.
When the proportion of yes-voters y were observable, no referendum is needed to have
the proposal accepted or rejected according to the majority of the voters. This benchmark
case is referred to as the population majority outcome. To be precise, denote by A the
event that the proposal is accepted and by R = Ac the event that it is rejected. The
population majority outcome is then de¯ned as A when y > 1
2 and R when y < 1
2. When
y = 1
2, the population majority outcome prescribes both A and R with probability 1
2.
However, for notational convenience A is prescribed but we assume that this case does not
occur, i.e. P[y = 1
2] = 0.
Since voters have the possibility to abstain from voting, the proportion of yes-voters y
is not directly observable. This paper analyzes whether a referendum can be designed in
such a way that the population majority outcome always occurs.
2.2. The Voters. A voter who is in favor of the proposal is referred to as a yes-voter, a
voter who is against the proposal as a no-voter. The typical yes-voter will be indicated
by index i and the typical no-voter by index j. Whether a voter will indeed participate
depends on her net bene¯t of doing so. A voter participates in the referendum if her net
utility of doing so is positive. In our model, this net utility of voting has the form proposed
by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). As in their model, the net utility consists of three terms:
i) a cost of voting; ii) a \consumption bene¯t from the act of voting" and iii) a utility
from the outcome of the referendum depending on its probability of occurrence. The main
2It is possible to allow for voters who are indi®erent with respect to the proposal by assuming that
this group has a ¯xed size and that due to a lack of motivation these voters do never participate in the
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di®erence between their model and mine is how the utility depends on the outcome of the
referendum.
A voter who decides to indeed cast her vote, incurs a cost c > 0 representing the e®ort
to go to the ballot box. Since there is a continuum of voters, the impact of a single voter
on the outcome is nil. If voters were only concerned about the strategic bene¯t of voting
and its cost, this would lead to the well-known paradox that none of the voters would
take the e®ort to cast a ballot. Cultural theories of voting argue that the incorporation of
\civic engagement" eliminates the paradox. In an empirical study, Blais, Young and Lapp
(2000) ¯nd support for this hypothesis. In explaining voter turnout, the cost of voting
and a return depending on the outcome of the referendum matter, but only among the
voters with a relatively weak civic engagement.
In the model this civic engagement is a moral pressure to vote that di®ers across voters.
Let mi be the moral pressure of yes-voter i. The moral pressure of a yes-voter has a
uniform distribution on the interval [¹ my ¡ ®
2; ¹ my + ®
2] so that the average moral pressure
of yes-voters is given by ¹ my. Similarly, assume that the moral pressure of no-voters has
a uniform distribution on the interval [¹ mn ¡ ®
2; ¹ mn + ®
2]. The moral pressure is felt as a
disutility when a voter is not voting. Since there are no strong arguments why yes- and
no-voters should have di®erently shaped moral pressure distributions, they are taken as
identical. Hence, the scaling parameter ® that determines the within-group heterogeneity
is the same for both sides. The average moral pressures though can be di®erent. This
allows for the proposal to unequally a®ect the yes- and no-voters, so that one side might
be more inclined to vote. Di®erent average moral pressures can thus cause a bias towards
accepting or rejecting the proposal.
The dependence on the outcome is modeled in the following way. A yes-voter wants
the proposal to be accepted and derives utility in this case. The utility a yes-voter derives
from acceptance of the proposal can depend on whether the voter indeed participates
in the referendum or not. Let the utility of an accepted proposal for a participating
yes-voter be °v, while it is °nv for a non-participating yes-voter.3 Similarly, when the
proposal is rejected, a participating no-voter derives utility °v while a non-participating
no-voter derives utility °nv. For °v > °nv, voters derive more utility from their preferred
outcome when they have participated. When the reversed inequality holds, a voter likes
her preferred outcome best when it occurs without costing her any e®ort. If °v 6= °nv, the
additional bias towards accepting or rejecting the proposal might either o®set or strengthen
the bias stemming from di®erent average moral pressures.
3This is equivalent to the more elaborate modelling where disutility is derived from rejection of the
proposal. For example, when participating yes-voters derive utility ¯
vAP[A] in case of acceptance and
¯







noting that the constant can be absorbed by rescaling of ¹ m
y, as will be made clear below, gives the result.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 8
utility of yes-voter i
voting °vPv[A] ¡ c
not voting °nvPnv[A] ¡ mi
net utility of voting °v(Pv[A] ¡ Pnv[A]) + (°v ¡ °nv)Pnv[A] ¡c + mi
Riker-Ordeshook °v(Pv[A] ¡ Pnv[A]) + (°v ¡ °nv)Pnv[A] ¡c + mi
this model °v(Pv[A] ¡ Pnv[A]) + (°v ¡ °nv)P[A]nv ¡c + mi
Table 1. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) assume that the utility of the out-
come does not depend on participation, so °v = °nv. However, when
the impact of a single voter is nihil, the probability of acceptance P[A]
is independent of voter i's participation and the outcome only a®ects the
participation decision through di®erences between °v and °nv.
The outcome of the referendum is unknown when the voters have to make their decisions.
The ex ante expected utility thus depends on the probability of acceptance or rejection.
Theoretically these probabilities can depend on whether a voter participates or not, so
denote the probability of acceptance by Pv[A] when a voter participates and by Pnv[A]
when she does not. For a yes-voter, the expected utility derived from the outcome of the
referendum is thus °vPv[A] or °nvPnv[A] depending on whether she is participating or not.
The utilities of a yes-voter are summarized in Table 1, for a no-voter identical expressions
hold when the probability of acceptance is replaced by the probability of rejection.4 The
net utility of voting is shown in the third line. The ¯rst term is a utility di®erence caused
by voter i's impact on the outcome, the second term is a utility di®erence due to di®erent
valuations of the outcome when a voter participates or not. Econometricians would call
the latter an interaction e®ect. It captures nonlinearities that arise from the participation
and the outcome. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) assume that the utility of the outcome
does not depend on the voter's decision, so °v = °nv. The outcome thus only a®ects
voters' decisions through di®erent probabilities of acceptance. However, the probability
that a particular voter is pivotal is extremely small when the population is large. For
example, consider a population of 5 million voters of which 50.1% is expected to be in
favor. Feddersen (2004) uses a formula derived by Myerson (2000) to ¯nd estimates for
the probability of a pivotal vote of the order 10¡9. This shows that even when °v and
°nv are close, di®erent valuations of the outcome may be far more important than the
utility di®erence caused by the voter's impact. Although voter's tend to overestimate
4We implicitly assume that whenever a voter cast her ballot, she votes according to whether she is in
favor or against. In other words, all voters are sincere. It is necessary to assume this since each voter is
atomistic and her decision is not a®ecting the outcome. However, sincere voting is guaranteed when the
voter's morality leads to a large negative utility when she votes for the non-preferred outcome.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 9
their impact, as for example found be Blais et al. (2000), their biases should be of a very
high order to outweigh the e®ects of di®erent valuations.
To focus on how di®erent valuations a®ect the referendum outcome, we abstain from
the small impact of a single voter by assuming a continuum of voters. Hence, no strategic
concerns are incorporated in the decision making process at the individual level.5 The
probability of acceptance does not depend on the voter's action and is denoted by P[A];
the probability of rejection is then P[R] = 1¡P[A]. The expression of the net utility shows
that the levels of the utilities derived from acceptance or rejection are not relevant for the
behavior of the voters, only their di®erence matters. De¯ne ° = °v ¡ °nv as the excess
utility of the preferred outcome of voting relative to not-voting.
It is not clear what the sign of ° should be, or even whether it should be non-zero. We
hence do not make any assumptions and discuss the model for all possible values of °.
When ° = 0, the outcome of the referendum is not relevant for the decision of a voter
whether to vote or not. For this reason we refer to these voters as simple-hearted voters.
When ° < 0, the outcome of the referendum will give a higher utility when the voter does
not cast her vote. This captures the feeling of a voter who likes her preferred outcome best
if she does not have to do anything for it to occur. A higher probability of her preferred
outcome makes a voter less willing to vote. This resembles the \underdog e®ect" reported
by Levine and Palfrey (2007) in a laboratorial experiment: voters supporting the less
popular alternative have higher participation rates. Another way of interpreting this
behavior is suggested by Haan and Kooreman (2003). For a ¯nite number of voters they
show that the side with the highest number of supporters can still be the most likely to
lose due to free-riding behavior. When ° < 0 voters balance their moral pressures with
the outcome of the referendum, and we therefore refer to them as calculating voters.
When ° > 0, the more likely it is that the preferred outcome will occur, the more likely
a voter will participate. This represents a voter who wants to be part of the winning team:
the higher the probability of winning, the more likely she wants to take action to support
it. This is in line with the expressive voting model of Schuessler (2000) in which bene¯ts
from attachment to a collective lead to a preference for the winning party. For example,
Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2006) ¯nd evidence that although in Belgian municipal
elections turnout is highest when the largest party obtains a small majority, turnout is
again stimulated when there is a clear winner with at least two thirds of the votes. Further
support that some voters want to be a winner is given by Bartels (1988) who shows that
the public opinion before US presidential elections tends towards the winner of the most
recent primary election. Remarkably, Clausen (1968) ¯nds that in post-election recall
surveys the winning candidate's support is overestimated and concludes that apparently
5In Section 4 we will give interest groups the possibility to coordinate the individuals. This allows
individuals to indirectly strategically a®ect the outcome.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 10
too many people \remember" to have contributed to the victory. Since voters cluster
together when ° > 0, we refer to them as a®ectionate voters.
The above expressions show that the cost c of casting the ballot can be absorbed in the
mean moral pressures ¹ my and ¹ mn. Without loss of generality, the exposition of the model
can thus focus on the case c = 0. It also shows that there is an alternative interpretation
of the model in which all voters have the same moral pressures, but di®er in their cost of
voting.
2.3. Equilibrium. Since all voters have the same information, they make the same in-
ference about P[A] and P[R]. For notational convenience we assume that when a voter is
indi®erent between voting or abstaining will vote. An equilibrium can then be character-
ized by two switching points ¡°p and ¡°r such that yes-voter i only votes if mi ¸ ¡°p,
no-voter j only votes if mj ¸ ¡°r, P[A] = p and P[R] = r. Since p+r = P[A]+P[R] = 1,
an equilibrium is fully characterized by p. To ¯nd the equilibria, it thus su±ces to analyze
for all p 2 [0;1], whether p ¡ P[A] = 0 when the yes- and no-voter switching points are
¡°p and ¡°(1 ¡ p) respectively.
Let Y = P[mi ¸ ¡°p] denote the probability that yes-voter i will vote. Invoking the
law of large numbers, see Judd (1985), Y also denotes the proportion of yes-voters who
are voting. Hence, Y will be referred to as the propensity to vote of yes-voters. Similarly,




























A similar expression holds for N. Note that Y and N are both functions of p.
When the proportion of yes-voters equals y, the measure of participating yes-voters is
given by yY and the measure of participating no-voters by (1 ¡ y)N. The participation
rate is thus given by yY +(1¡y)N. When q 2 [0;1] denotes the quorum, the referendum
is valid if yY + (1 ¡ y)N ¸ q. This is the quorum condition. When the referendum is
valid, the proposal is accepted if the majority of the participating voters is in favor, so if
yY ¸ (1 ¡ y)N (for notational convenience the proposal is accepted when exactly half of
the voters is in favor). This is the majority condition. In case the referendum is not valid,
the preset default outcome D 2 fA;Rg determines the outcome.
Table 2 relates the probabilities of accepting the proposal with the propensities to vote
and the quorum. Suppose that the default outcome is rejecting the proposal, D = R (the
case D = A follows from symmetric arguments). First suppose that yes-voters are more
likely to participate than no-voters, so Y > N. A higher proportion y of yes-voters makes
a valid referendum more likely since more voters will actually vote (a yes-voter is more
likely to vote than a no-voter), and it makes it more likely that the proposal is accepted
(there are more participating yes-voters). When the quorum is below 2NY=(Y + N),
the quorum is relatively easily met and the majority condition determines the probabilityFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 11
condition constraint P[A]
Y > N and q · 2NY
Y +N majority P[y ¸ N
Y +N]
Y > N and q ¸ 2NY
Y +N quorum P[y ¸
q¡N
Y ¡N]
Y = N both P[y ¸ 1
2]1 1fY ¸qg
Y < N both P[
q¡N
Y ¡N ¸ y ¸ N
Y +N]
Table 2. Binding constraints and the probability of accepting the proposal
when the default outcome is rejection.
of acceptance (note that for q = 2NY=(Y + N) the majority and quorum constraint
coincide). For a higher quorum instead it is determined by the quorum constraint. Now
suppose that Y < N. A higher fraction of yes-voters y makes a valid referendum less
likely since less voters will actually vote (a yes-voter is less likely to vote than a no-voter),
but if the referendum is valid it is more likely that the proposal is accepted (there are
more participating yes-voters). Both constraints are binding, the quorum constraint from
above, the majority constraint from below. Note that when Y = N, the quorum can only
be met if q · Y = N. In this case the probability of accepting is determined by the
majority condition.
An equilibrium in case D = R is thus a solution of p ¡ P[A] = 0, where P[A], Y and N
are as discussed above. This equilibrium characterization is at the core of the analysis.
3. The Quorum and the Population Majority Outcome
3.1. Simple-Hearted Voters. Suppose that the voters are simple-hearted, so ° = 0.
The expectations about the outcome of the referendum do not a®ect the voter's decision
whether to vote or not. This implies that the choice of the quorum does not a®ect the
propensities to vote. Any bias that stems from di®erent average moral pressures can thus
be directly addressed by a quorum. The following proposition states that with the right
choice of the quorum and the default option, the population majority outcome occurs.
Proposition 1. (Simple-Hearted Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)
Assume that ° = 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2; ®
2).
i) When ¹ my = ¹ mn, the population majority outcome is only achieved in the unique equi-
librium of the referendum with a quorum of at most q¤ = 1
2 + ¹ my+ ¹ mn
2® and default outcome
D 2 fA;Rg.
ii) When ¹ my 6= ¹ mn, the population majority outcome is only achieved in the unique equi-
librium of the referendum with quorum q¤ = 1
2 + ¹ my+ ¹ mn
2® and default outcome D = R if
¹ my > ¹ mn and D = A otherwise.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 12
In order to discuss the implications of the proposition, it is insightful to look ¯rst
at the propensities to vote. The condition that ¹ my and ¹ mn are contained in (¡®
2; ®
2)
implies that they are given by Y ¤ = 1
2 + ¹ my=® and N¤ = 1
2 + ¹ mn=® and that they
are contained in (0;1), see Equation (1). This assures that on each side some voters
do abstain from voting while others cast their votes. It hence excludes the less relevant
cases where all voters of a side vote or all of them do not vote. The ¯rst statement of
the proposition assumes that the propensities to vote are equal for yes- and no-voters.
Obviously, a majority of yes-voters in the whole population, y ¸ 1
2, will then lead to a
majority of yes-voters among the participating voters. The participation rate is constant
and equal to yY ¤ +(1¡y)N¤ = Y ¤ = N¤. In this case, any quorum below or equal to the
propensity Y ¤ or N¤ is automatically met and the default outcome is free to choose (in
the proposition the average propensity 1
2(Y ¤+N¤) is used to stress the similarity with the
optimal quorum in the second statement). Since the majority of the participating voters
perfectly re°ects the majority among the population, the population majority outcome is
achieved. Note especially that the quorum q = 0 is allowed, which is identical to the case
of not having a quorum. Intuitively, when the propensities to vote are equal, there is no
bias towards accepting or rejecting the proposal and no quorum is needed. However, since
the participation rate is constant, any su±ciently low quorum does no harm.
The second statement assumes that the propensities to vote are di®erent. With the
found expressions for Y ¤ and N¤, the optimal quorum can be expressed as the average
propensity to vote 1
2(Y ¤ + N¤). To see why this is the case, assume that ¹ my > ¹ mn
(symmetric arguments hold for the opposite case). This assumption implies that Y ¤ > N¤.
Yes-voters are more likely to vote and without a quorum there is a bias towards accepting
the proposal. When a quorum is introduced, it can only o®set this bias if the default
outcome is rejecting the proposal, D = R. The participation rate yY ¤ + (1 ¡ y)N¤ is
strictly increasing in y. This shows that a majority of the population is in favor of the
proposal, y ¸ 1
2, if and only if the participation rate is higher than 1
2(Y ¤ + N¤). The
population majority outcome can thus be achieved by the quorum q¤ = 1
2(Y ¤+N¤). Note
that the majority constraint is redundant: whenever the referendum is valid, a majority of
the participating voters is in favor of the proposal. Instead of the fraction of participating
voters in favor, the participation rate is the decisive variable. The model thus has a strong
prediction: for a correctly set quorum the default outcome will never occur as the outcome
of a valid referendum.
At ¯rst sight it might seem counterintuitive that the optimal quorum is increasing in
the propensity to vote of both yes- and no-voters: the bias towards accepting is increased
when yes-voters become more likely to vote, but it is decreased when no-voters become
more likely to vote. An increased bias might need a higher quorum and a decreased bias a
lower quorum. This reasoning correctly assesses the e®ect on the bias in the absence of aFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 13
quorum. However, when the optimal quorum is imposed, the previous paragraph showed
that the majority constraint is redundant. An increase in the propensity to vote of yes-
voters has an identical e®ect on the quorum constraint as an increase in the propensity
to vote of no-voters. More voters will indeed vote, so the quorum is more likely to be
met and the probability of accepting the proposal is increased. To achieve the population
majority outcome, an increase in the quorum is needed.
3.2. Calculating Voters. Now suppose that the voters are calculating, so ° < 0. The
potential disutility of an unnecessary vote makes that less voters indeed take the e®ort to
cast their ballots compared to the simple-hearted voters. Ceteris paribus, this leads to a
lower optimal quorum. To construct a referendum that achieves the population majority
outcome, the probability of a majority of yes-voters among the whole population is needed.
Let » denote this probability, so » = P[y ¸ 1
2]. From the assumptions on the distribution
of y it follows that » 2 (0;1). The following proposition states that with the right design
of the referendum, the population majority outcome occurs.
Proposition 2. (Calculating Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)
Assume that ° < 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2 ¡ °; ®
2).
i) When ¹ my = ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»), the population majority outcome is only achieved in the
unique equilibrium of the referendum with a quorum of at most q¤ = 1
2 +
¹ my+ ¹ mn+°
2® and
default outcome D 2 fA;Rg.
ii) When ¹ my 6= ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»), the population majority outcome is only achieved in the
unique equilibrium of the referendum with quorum q¤ = 1
2 +
¹ my+ ¹ mn+°
2® and the default
outcome D = R if ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and D = A otherwise.
The intuition for the proposition follows again from ¯rst looking to the propensities to
vote. In the population majority outcome the probability that the proposal is accepted is
given by ». The probability that the proposal is rejected is then given by 1¡». This means
that the propensities to vote of yes-voters and no-voters are given by Y ¤ = 1
2+(¹ my+°»)=®
and N¤ = 1
2 +(¹ mn+° ¡°»)=® respectively. The condition that ¹ my and ¹ mn are contained
in (¡®
2 ¡°; ®
2) implies that for all » 2 (0;1) the propensities to vote Y ¤ and N¤ are between
0 and 1. In other words, the condition ensures that for a fraction °=® of the voters indeed
their voting decisions depend on their expectations (that ° < ® follows from the same
condition). The ¯rst statement of the proposition now claims that when the propensities
to vote are equal for yes- and no-voters, the referendum with a quota below or equal to
1
2(Y ¤ +N¤) achieves the population majority outcome. The reason is the same as for the
simple-hearted voters: with equal propensities to vote the fractions of yes- and no-voters
among the participating voters are identical to the population fractions. No quorum is
needed, but a su±ciently small quorum does not a®ect the outcome of the referendum
since the participation rate is constant.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 14
When the propensities are not equal, according to the second statement a quorum
is needed to achieve the population majority outcome. In fact, the optimal quorum is
again the average of the propensities to vote, but now evaluated at the equilibrium, q¤ =
1
2(Y ¤ + N¤). To get more intuition, assume that ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») (symmetric
arguments hold for the opposite case). This implies that Y ¤ > N¤. Similar to the model
with simple-hearted voters, a quorum with rejecting as default outcome, D = R, is needed
to o®set the bias towards accepting. The participation rate yY ¤ + (1 ¡ y)N¤ is strictly
increasing in y. The majority of the population is in favor if and only if the participation
rate is higher than 1
2(Y ¤ + N¤). Since in this case the yes-voters constitute a majority,
the quorum q¤ = 1
2(Y ¤ + N¤) achieves the population majority outcome.
Compared to the model with simple-hearted voters, there are two important di®er-
ences. Firstly, ceteris paribus the optimal quorum is lower in case of calculating voters.
Comparing the expressions for q¤ in the second statements of Propositions 1 and 2 shows
that in the model with calculating voters the quorum is ¡°=® lower. Some of the vot-
ers who would have cast their ballot when they would have been simple-hearted, prefer
not to do so when they are calculating. A lower quorum is needed to o®set a lower par-
ticipation rate. This shows that when the referendum is designed for a population of
simple-hearted voters while instead the voters are calculating, the quorum is set too high.
In case ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»), the quorum will only be met when the true proportion of
yes-voters is at least y¤ for y¤ > 1
2. The proposal is thus rejected for y 2 [1
2;y¤). When
P[y 2 [1
2;y¤)] > 0, the referendum with the incorrectly set quorum will not achieve the
population majority outcome and there is a tendency towards the default outcome R.
A second di®erence compared to the model with simple-hearted voters is that the design
of the optimal referendum requires knowledge of » = P[y ¸ 1
2]. Somewhat surprisingly,
this knowledge is not needed for setting the optimal quorum. Instead, the knowledge
of » is needed for setting the default outcome optimally. Intuitively, for the optimal
quorum only the sum of the reductions in voters matters, while for the optimal default
outcome the di®erence matters. When ° = 0 the propensity to vote is independent of the
expectations. However, when ° < 0 the propensities to vote will in general depend on
°. Only when a population majority of yes- and no-voters is equally likely, so » = 1
2, the
default outcomes coincide with those in case of simple-hearted voters. When » 6= 1
2, there
will be fewer participating yes- and no-voters in equilibrium than in case of simple-hearted
voters. When » > 1
2, the decrease in yes-voters is larger than the decrease in no-voters.
The choice of the default outcome needs to take account of this e®ect. The term °(1¡2»)
in the conditions accomplishes this. This e®ect is increasing in the extent to which voters
calculate, °. Note that the model with simple-hearted voters can be seen as the limiting
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3.3. A®ectionate Voters. Now consider the model with a®ectionate voters, so ° > 0.
The expectations about the outcome of the referendum again matter. But now the higher
the probability that the preferred outcome occurs, the more likely that a voter indeed
casts her ballot. Ceteris paribus, this leads to more participating voters and hence to a
higher optimal quorum than in case of simple-hearted voters. Compared to those voters,
the a®ectionate voters have a tendency to behave in a coordinated way. This gives raise
to the possibility of multiple equilibria. The following proposition states that although
the referendum can be designed such that the population majority outcome occurs, under
a certain condition there is indeed another equilibrium.
Proposition 3. (A®ectionate Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)
Assume that ° > 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2; ®
2 ¡ °).
i) The population majority outcome is achieved in an equilibrium of the referendum de-
signed as speci¯ed in Proposition 2.
ii) For the quorum q¤, the equilibrium mentioned in i) is the unique equilibrium when
j¹ my ¡ ¹ mnj ¸ °, otherwise there is a single alternative equilibrium which is characterized
by P[D] = 1.
The ¯rst statement shows that the expressions for the optimal quorum in case of calcu-
lating voters also hold for a®ectionate voters. Compared to the model with simple-hearted
voters, the optimal quorum is higher with a®ectionate voters since voters are more likely
to participate. Comparing the expressions for the optimal quorum of the three models
shows that the quorum is increasing in the extent of a®ection ° (or decreasing in the extent
voters calculate ¡°).
The proposition states that multiple equilibria can indeed arise. The second statement
claims that when ¹ my and ¹ mn are su±ciently close to each other, the optimal quorum
does not necessarily lead to the population majority outcome.6 In fact, this quorum can
discourage the opponents of the default outcome from voting, an e®ect that is aggravated
by the tendency to coordinate. This might give raise to an equilibrium where none of
the voters expects the quorum to be met and because the voters adapt their behavior to
this expectation, the quorum will indeed never be met. When j¹ my ¡ ¹ mnj < ° the fact
that voters base their decisions to vote on expectations together with their tendency to
coordinate gives rise to self-ful¯lling equilibria. When instead the di®erence between ¹ my
and ¹ mn is su±ciently big, the equilibrium with P[D] = 1 is not feasible anymore. To see
why, suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °. Even when P[R] = 1 the propensity to vote of yes-voters is
(weakly) higher as that of no-voters. There will be a positive probability of accepting the
proposal, which is a contradiction.
6In case ¹ m
y = ¹ m
n + °(1 ¡ 2») and q < q
¤ the equilibrium can be unique, but there can also be two
other equilibria, see Appendix B for details.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 16
Figure 1. In case of cal-
culating voters the optimal
quorum leads to a unique
equilibrium with the pop-
ulation majority outcome
(P[A] = »).
Figure 2. In case of af-
fectionate voters the opti-
mal quorum can also lead
to a second equilibrium in
which the proposal is never















Y (p) = N(p)
A graphical representation provides additional insight in why the equilibrium is neces-
sarily unique for the calculating voters but not for the a®ectionate voter. In Figures 1
and 2, p ¡ P[A] is shown as function of p for calculating and a®ectionate voters respec-
tively. Recall that in equilibrium p ¡ P[A] = 0. In case of calculating voters, ° < 0,
the propensity to vote Y = 1
2 + (¹ my + °p)=® is decreasing in p. The propensity to vote
N = 1
2 + (¹ mn + ° ¡ °p)=® is increasing in p at the same rate. The participation rate for
y = 1
2 is thus independent of p. But as discussed above, for the optimal quorum only the
quorum constraint is binding. This implies that for all p the quorum constraint is also
satis¯ed if and only if y ¸ 1
2. For small p the probability of accepting the proposal is then
» until the no-voters are more likely to participate than yes-voters. In this case the quo-
rum constraint and the majority constraint cannot be simultaneously met and P[A] = 0.
The function p ¡ P[A] is thus strictly increasing and has a un upwards jump. Since it is
increasing, is crosses the x-axis at most once. The choice of the default outcome implies
that the jump is after », so that indeed an equilibrium exists.
In case of a®ectionate voters, ° > 0, Y is increasing in p and N decreasing. Arguments
opposite to the ones above show that P[A] is zero for small p, while it jumps to » for larger
p. This implies that p ¡ P[A] is not strictly increasing in p. There can be two equilibria:
one with P[A] = 0 and one with P[A] = ». The choice of the default outcome guarantees
that the latter equilibrium exists. When j¹ my¡ ¹ mnj < °, yes-voters have a lower propensity
to vote than no-voters for p = 0. This implies that the quorum constraint and the majority
constraint cannot be simultaneously. Since then P[A] = 0, there is a second equilibrium
in which the default outcome always occurs.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 17
3.4. Heterogenous Voter Types. We now allow for heterogenous voters. To be more
speci¯c, the population can consist of simple-hearted, calculating and a®ectionate voters.
Moreover, the parameters ® and ° can di®er across voters. This means that a voter k
is de¯ned by her preference, i.e. in favor or against the proposal, and the parameters
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Note that this restriction resembles the assumptions on ¹ my and ¹ mn in Proposition 1-3. In
fact, for any parameters (¹ mk;®k;°k) 2 ^ P the assumption in the proposition indicated by
°k is satis¯ed for ¹ mk, ®k and °k. Denote the distribution function of the parameters of
yes-voter i by ©y and of no-voter j by ©n. By the law of large numbers, ©y and ©n are
also the population distributions. Denote the density functions by Áy and Án respectively.
The ¯rst condition on the density functions is that Áy(¹ mk;®k;°k) = Án(¹ mk;®k;°k) = 0 if
(¹ mk;®k;°k) = 2 ^ P. This assures that of all the yes- or no-voters with a type (¹ mk;®k;°k)
that can occur, some will indeed vote while others will not. Now de¯ne the following
average parameters of the yes-voters






















Denote the counterparts for the no-voters by ¹ mn and °n. The second condition on the
density function is that °y = °n. Since this is equivalent to Ey[°i=®i] = En[°j=®j], this
condition is satis¯ed if for example ¹ mk and (®k;°k) are independently distributed and the
density function for (®k;°k) is independent of being in favor or against the proposal. The
common density function is the analogue of the assumption made in the previous section
that ° is a population parameter and that the scaling parameter ® of the moral pressure
distribution is equal for both voter groups. Although this assumption is mainly made to
keep the model tractable, there are no reasons to assume that °y and °n are very di®erent.
When they are close to each other, the outcomes will be similar to when they are identical.
De¯ne ° = °y = °n. The second condition implies that both the average type, i.e. simple-
hearted, calculating or a®ectionate, and the extent of the a®ection (or the extent to which
voters are calculating) scaled by ® are equal among yes- and no-voters. The following
proposition claims that knowledge of these average parameters together with » = P[y ¸ 1
2]
is su±cient to design a referendum that achieves the population majority outcome.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 18
Proposition 4. (Heterogenous Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)





Then, the quorum, default outcome and uniqueness of the population majority outcome are
as in the model with only the representative voter types de¯ned by (¹ my;1;°) and (¹ mn;1;°).
The proposition states that when the population consists of simple-hearted, calculating
and a®ectionate voters and when the other parameters are allowed to vary across the
voters, the quorum and default options should be set as for the population that only
consists of the representative voter types (¹ my;1;°) and (¹ mn;1;°). Hence, the analysis
in the ¯rst three subsections is not a simpli¯cation but instead describes models with
heterogenous voter types as well. When the signs and sizes of individual °k's can be
di®erent, an increase in p has di®erent e®ects on voters with di®erent °k's. In case of
di®erent signs, it makes some voters more willing to vote and others less. Only the
average e®ect counts for setting the optimal quorum. Note that the representative voter
types also determine whether the optimal quorum necessarily results in the population
majority outcome or that the equilibrium with P[D] = 1 can occur as well.
4. A Non-Optimal Quorum
In this section we analyze the consequences of a non-optimal quorum. There are two
reasons why a non-optimal quorum can arise. Firstly, the quorum could have been set
non-optimally due to insu±cient knowledge about the relevant parameters or for political
reasons. Secondly, after the quorum is set, whether optimally or not, pressure groups have
incentives to a®ect the behavior of voters in order to make their preferred outcome more
likely.
Throughout it is assumed that the proportion of yes-voters y has a uniform distribution
on [y;y] with y < 1
2 < y. Let Á denote the density, so Á = (y ¡ y)¡1. The probability of
accepting the proposal according to the population majority is then given by » = Á(y¡ 1
2).
The analyses for the default outcomes A and R are symmetric. We assume D = R so
the proposal can only be accepted when the referendum is valid and when a majority of
the participating voters is in favor.
4.1. A Not-Optimally Set Quorum. First consider the simple-hearted voters with
° = 0. The outcome of the referendum does not a®ect the behavior of the voters so the
propensities to vote Y and N are ¯xed. When it is known which constraints are binding,
the probability of accepting the proposal can be computed in a straightforward manner
using the three cases considered in Subsection 2.3. Denote this probability by pm when
only the majority constraint is binding, by pq when only the quorum constraint is binding
and by pb when both constraints are binding. Let s denote the sum of the propensities


















To analyze the e®ect of the quorum on the probability of accepting the proposal, these
equilibrium probabilities are related to the quorum in the following proposition. Instead
of framing the proposition in terms of the deep parameters ¹ my, ¹ mn, ® and °, it is easier
to use Y and N.
Proposition 5. (Simple-Hearted Voters and a Not-Optimally Set Quorum)
Suppose ° = 0.
i) Suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn and N





pm if q · 2Y N
s ;
pq if 2Y N
s < q · yY + (1 ¡ y)N;
0 if yY + (1 ¡ y)N < q:
ii) Suppose ¹ my < ¹ mn and N





pm if q · yY + (1 ¡ y)N;
pb if yY + (1 ¡ y)N · q · 2Y N
s ;
0 if 2Y N
s · q:
A ¯rst observation is that for every quorum an equilibrium exists. To see why this is
the case, the function p ¡ P[A] is key. Although for the optimal quorum q¤ this function
is discontinuous in p, it is continuous for a non-optimal quorum. Together with the fact
that P[A] 2 [0;1] this shows that there is at least one p 2 [0;1] for which p ¡ P[A] = 0.
There thus exists an equilibrium.
When the propensity to vote is higher for yes-voters than for no-voters, Y > N, the
default outcome is correctly set. This case is discussed in the ¯rst statement of the
proposition and depicted in Figure 3. The probability of acceptance is constant for a
low quorum. The quorum will always be met and the majority constraint is binding. The
de¯nition of pm shows that in this case pm > ». Intuitively, for a quorum below the optimal
quorum q¤, the referendum will be too often valid and the probability of acceptance is
above P[y ¸ 1
2]. Note that the condition N=s > y implies that pm < 1. When q increases,
more participating voters are needed to meet the quorum. Since Y > N, the required
proportion of yes-voters increases. When q increases further, the quorum constraint takes
over from the majority constraint. The probability of acceptance decreases and crosses
». For higher q it can reach a level such that even with the highest participation rateFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 20
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Figure 3. The e®ect of the quorum on the probability of acceptance when













yY + (1 ¡ y)N the quorum can not be met. From here on, the probability of acceptance
equals zero.
When the propensities to vote for yes- and no-voters are equal, the participation rate
is constant. The quorum constraint is either always satis¯ed or never. According to the
¯rst statement, pq does not occur since the two borders are equal. The probability of
acceptance suddenly drops from pm = » to 0 if q raises above 1
2s.
The second statement assumes that the default outcome is incorrectly set. The def-
inition of pm shows that even when the quorum is so low that it is not a®ecting the
referendum, the probability of acceptance is below the population majority outcome ».
The condition N=s < y implies that the probability of acceptance is positive. When
the quorum constraint becomes binding, it imposes an upper bound on the proportion
of yes-voters. Since the propensity to vote is lower for yes-voters than for no-voters, the
quorum will not be met when there are too many yes-voters. When the quorum is higher
than 2Y N=s more than half of the participating voters should be no-voters, but then the
majority constraint cannot be satis¯ed and the probability of accepting the proposal is
zero.
The proposition shows that when the quorum is lower than the optimal quorum q¤, the
probability of accepting the proposal is at most pm. It also shows that when the quorum
is set higher than the optimal quorum, it can be 0. Especially when the di®erence between
the average moral pressures ¹ my and ¹ mn is small, so that Y and N are similar and pm is
close to », it is less harmful when the quorum is set too low than too high. Moreover,
7This ¯gure uses ® = 2, ° 2 f¡0:9;0;0:9g, y = 0:3, y = 0:8 and thus » = 0:6. Since the range of
admissible values of ¹ m
y and ¹ m
n is determined by °, the average moral pressures need to be adjusted for
di®erent values of °. Using ¹ m
y = 0:2 and ¹ m
n = ¡0:2 when ° = 0, the adjustment ¹ m




n = ¡0:2 ¡
1
2° achieves that the optimal quorum is the same for all ° and equal to
1
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suppose that the exact values of ¹ my and ¹ mn are not known. When the quorum is based on
their expected values, it will be as often too low as too high. But to assess the e®ect on the
outcome, it is important that a too high quorum is more harmful. Hence, the uncertainty
about the average moral pressures causes the proposal to be rejected too often.
When ° 6= 0, the propensities to vote depend on the probability that the proposal
is accepted, which in turn depends on the propensities to vote. As in the case for the
simple-hearted voters, the equilibrium probabilities can be computed if it is known which
constraints are binding. We here discuss the results using Figure 3; Appendix B contains
the precise statements.
For the model with calculating voters, so ° < 0, an equilibrium exists for every quorum
when ° is not too negative. This ensures that changes in the probability of accepting
the proposal do not have too big impacts. Note that the interpretation of ° as the av-
erage across heterogenous voters suggest that the value of ° is not that extreme. Since
the calculating voters show some \balancing" behavior, changes in q e®ect the equilib-
rium probability more gradually than for the simple-hearted voters. The e®ects of a
not-optimally set quorum are thus similar though less severe.
The model with a®ectionate voters, ° > 0, is more complicated. Here, an upper bound
on ° is needed to limit the e®ect of the equilibrium probability on the voters. As was shown
in the previous section, even for the optimal quorum two equilibria can exist. When the
quorum is not optimally set there can be up to three equilibria.8 As before, multiple
equilibria can arise since the model resembles a coordination game. Voters act according
to what they expect and thereby make their expectations happen, in other words, there
are self-ful¯lling prophecies. Changes in q thus have a larger impact than for the simple-
hearted voters. Note especially that when the quorum is set already slightly too high
(in the ¯gure the optimal quorum is 0:5), a sure rejection will result. Again, setting the
quorum a bit too low is less harmful than setting it a bit too high.
In case of three equilibria, the middle one only serves to separate the others. This
equilibrium is unstable in the sense that when a small fraction of voters changes behavior,
this would trigger changes in the behavior of other voters that would ultimately lead to one
of the other equilibria. Although their instability makes them less appealing, they cannot
be completely ignored in the analysis. Clearly, the properties of the stable and unstable
equilibria are opposites. So, a higher quorum decreases the probability of acceptance in
the stable equilibria with a positive probability, but increases it in the unstable equilibria.
4.2. Pressure Groups. After the quorum is set, pressure groups might want to a®ect
the turnout of the voters. For example, in the Italian referendum no-voters were urged
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to go to the beach instead of the ballot box.9 In our model, we assume that pressure
groups cannot directly a®ect the behavior of voters of the other side: a yes-pressure group
can only a®ect the average moral pressure of the yes-voters ¹ my and a no-pressure group
only the average moral pressure of no-voters ¹ mn. In essence, the model has become a
group-based voting model of mobilization.
We still assume that the preferences of the voters are given. Although before this was
already a simpli¯cation, in the face of pressure groups, it needs even more justi¯cation.
Apart from a®ecting the participation rate of their side, these pressure groups have of
course incentives to try to convert voters. For example, Neijens and van Praag (2006)
discuss the dynamics of opinion formation and show that a large fraction of the voters
changes their opinion in the period before the election. The assumption that voters'
preferences are given thus implies that the model deals with the short period directly
preceding the referendum day. Since a®ecting the participation rate is just a part of the
pressure group strategy, we will only analyze its marginal e®ect. Its sign already indicates
in which direction a pressure group should a®ect the voters. Herrera and Mattozzi (2007)
discuss a referendum model where pressure groups setting the participation rates play
against each other.
4.2.1. Yes-Pressure Groups. The equilibrium probabilities of accepting the proposal follow
from rewriting the conditions stated in Proposition 5. The analysis of the not-optimally set
quorum dealt separately with a correctly and an incorrectly set default outcome. When the
e®ect of the average moral pressures is analyzed, it matters wether the moral propensity
to vote of the other side is above or below the quorum. Remember that the propensities
to vote Y and N should be between 0 and 1.
Proposition 6. (Simple-Hearted Voters and Yes-Pressure Groups)
Suppose ° = 0 and N >
y
1¡y.
i) Suppose N · q. Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if Y <
q¡(1¡y)N
y ;




or if N > 1
2q and
q¡(1¡y)N
y · Y ·
qN
2N¡q;




















9Hana¯n (2006) discusses in detail the strategic lobbying that preceded the enacting of the fertility law
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The ¯rst statement assumes that the propensity to vote of no-voters is so low that the
quorum is not met when everyone is against the proposal, when N < q, or exactly met
when N = q. This case is depicted in Figure 4. Even for low values of the average moral
pressure of yes-voters, the quorum will not be met. The propensity to vote needs to be
higher than q before the quorum can be met to o®set the low propensity of the no-voters.
In this case the quorum constraint will be binding. Now suppose that N is not too low, so
N > 1
2q. When ¹ my is increased further, the quorum constraint is always met and it is the
majority constraint that determines the equilibrium probability. When N is below 1
2q, the
majority constraint is always satis¯ed if the quorum constraint is satis¯ed. In this case
the equilibrium probability remains pq. The condition that N > y=(1¡y) guarantees that
P[A] < 1. Comparison between this proposition and Proposition 5 shows that increasing
Y is similar to decreasing q.
The second statement assumes that when all voters are no-voters, the quorum constraint
is met. In this case, the quorum can already be met for Y < q. The quorum constraint
is then binding from above, so the equilibrium probability is given by pb. When Y is
increased further, the quorum constraint is always satis¯ed. From here on pm determines
the equilibrium probability. Again, increasing Y is similar to decreasing q.
Figure 4 also shows the equilibria for calculating and a®ectionate voters. In both cases
the equilibrium lines are similar to the mirrored images of those in Figure 3. This re°ects
that increasing the propensity to vote of yes-voters is comparable to decreasing the quorum.
For the calculating voters there is again a unique equilibrium. The o®setting behavior
leads to positive probabilities for lower values of Y and to smoother e®ects of ¹ my in
10Figure 4 uses ¹ m
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general. Changes in the propensity to vote of yes-voters are partially undone by their own
calculating attitude.
In case of a®ectionate voters multiple equilibria again exist for intermediate values of
¹ my. The equilibria in the middle are unstable. Similar to the e®ect of a quorum slightly
higher than the optimal quorum, a propensity to vote slightly below the value for which
the quorum is optimal, which is 2q¡N, immediately leads to a sure rejection (in the ¯gure
the quorum is optimal for ¹ my + 1
2° = 0:2).
For all voter types, an increase in Y leads ceteris paribus to more participating yes-
voters. The majority constraint is met for lower values of y. Since there are more par-
ticipating voters also the quorum constraint is met for lower y. This shows that apart
from the unstable equilibria when ° > 0 and the equilibria with P[A] = 0, an increase
in Y raises the equilibrium probability of accepting the proposal. Loosely speaking, a
yes-pressure group should always encourage voters to participate by increasing ¹ my.
4.2.2. No-Pressure Groups. For no-pressures groups the recommendation is not that straight-
forward. On the one hand, an increase in N leads to more participating no-voters so that
the participating no-voters are a majority for lower y. On the other hand, an increase
in N leads to more participating voters so that the quorum is met for lower y. When
the referendum is valid more often, this can lead to a higher probability of accepting the
proposal. To analyze these opposite e®ects in more detail, the following proposition states
the equilibrium probabilities as function of N.
Proposition 7. (Simple-Hearted Voters and No-Pressure Groups)
Suppose ° = 0 and Y >
1¡y
y .





> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if Y <
q
y and N <
q¡yY
1¡y ;




1¡y · N ·
qY
2Y ¡q;
or if Y ¸
q





2Y ¡q · N:
ii) Suppose Y < q. Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if Y < 1
2q;
or if Y ¸ 1
2q and N <
qY
2Y ¡q;
pb if Y ¸ 1
2q and
qY
2Y ¡q · N ·
q¡yY
1¡y ;




The ¯rst statement assumes that Y > q. This case is depicted in Figure 5. When
Y < q=y the quorum is not met when N = 0. The equilibrium probability equals zero
until the quorum will be met when the proportion of yes-voters equals y. When Y ¸ q=y
the quorum constraint is binding from the beginning onwards. When N is su±cientlyFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 25
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high, the quorum constraint is always met and the majority constraint determines the
equilibrium probability. Since an increase in N makes a valid referendum more likely, pb is
increasing in N. On the other hand, an increase in N makes a majority of the participating
no-voters more likely, so pm is decreasing in N. It is clear that the maximum probability
of accepting the proposal is attained for N = qY=(2Y ¡ q). The condition Y < 1
2q=y
implies that the maximum probability of accepting the proposal is below 1. The condition
Y > (1 ¡ y)=y implies that even when N = 1, the yes-voters can constitute the majority
of the participating voters, so that P[A] > 0.
The second statement assumes that the propensity to vote of the yes-voters is below
the quorum. When the propensity is below 1
2q, the quorum constraint and the majority
constraint cannot be simultaneously met and the probability of accepting the proposal is
0. When Y ¸ 1
2q, the equilibrium probability is also zero for low N. Only for higher N it
becomes positive. Note that in this case N > q > Y , so that both constraints are binding.
The equilibrium probability is determined by pb until N is so high that the quorum is
always satis¯ed. From here on the majority constraint is binding.
For the calculating and the a®ectionate voters similar reasonings hold. It should not
come as a surprise that the equilibrium for the calculating voters is unique and as function
of ¹ mn °atter than for the simple-hearted voters. For the a®ectionate voters there are
multiple equilibria possible as before. Again, when N is slightly below the value implied
by the quorum, which is 2q ¡ Y , the only equilibrium has P[A] = 0 (in the ¯gure the
quorum is optimal for ¹ mn + 1
2° = ¡0:2).
It is clear than in all stable equilibria with P[A] > 0, the probability of acceptance
is increasing for low N and decreasing for high N. There thus exists a value of N for
11Figure 5 uses ¹ m
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which P[A] attains its maximum. Denote this value by ^ N. Under the conditions of the






2Y ¡q if Y ¸ q;
min
½






if Y < q:
The expression in the second line follows from setting the derivative of pb to zero and
noting that the maximum should be attained before the majority constraint takes over or
the propensity to vote exceeds 1. Loosely speaking, a no-pressure group should decrease
¹ mn when N is below ^ N and increase ¹ mn when N is higher than ^ N. This is in line with
intuition: when the propensity to vote of no-voters is rather high, the quorum is likely to
be met. To ensure that the participating no-voters form the majority, a no-pressure group
should encourage no-voters to vote. When on contrary the propensity to vote is rather
low, the quorum will probably not be met. A no-pressure group should now lower the
propensity to vote even further to decrease the probability that the quorum is met.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the impact of the quorum on referendum outcomes. Although
a quorum is potentially useful to attain the population majority outcome, this crucially
depends on the ability of setting the quorum at the appropriate level. Insu±cient knowl-
edge or a lack of political power to do so tend to favor the status quo. Moreover, when
voters care more about the outcome when they are participating, there can be a second
equilibrium in which the referendum is always invalid. Pressure groups opposing the pro-
posal should also strategically aim for an invalid outcome when turnout is expected to be
low.
This paper thus adds another critique concerning the use of referenda to the list of
Nurmi (1998). Without resorting to compulsory voting, the choice is between imposing
a quorum and accepting its possible distortions on the one hand and not imposing a
quorum and accepting the possible non-representativeness of the participating voters on
the other. Clearly, if a low turnout is expected, a referendum is not the ideal tool for
decision making. Also topics for which minority groups have some strong opinions should
be excluded from opinions. When the turnout on both sides is expected to be at least
moderate a referendum can be appropriate. The results of this paper suggest that in
this case imposing a quorum is more harmful than not imposing one. This argument for
abolishing the quorum complements the arguments of Felsenthal and Machover (1997)
who show that the highest degree of democratic participation is achieved, i.e. the opinion
of the average voter achieves its maximum impact, in the absence of a quorum. Without
a quorum, each side can only reach its aim by convincing voters of its position and of theFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 27
necessity to vote. This is clearly more in line with democratic principles than giving one
side the possibility to abuse the rules of the game.
However, in a recent referendum in Portugal about easing restrictions on abortion, the
Catholic Church did not urge voters to stay at home. Interestingly, late polls suggested a
signi¯cant majority of proponents, with as only doubt \whether enough voters will turn
out for the result to be constitutionally binding" (The Economist 2007). This would have
been the ideal case to discourage opponents from participating. Although this would
just have been strategically exploiting the referendum rules, reactions on their campaign
in Italy might have made the Catholic Church to act closer in line with the democratic
principles underlying referenda.
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Appendix A. Different Intensities of Voters' Preferences
Suppose that the proposal should only be accepted if at least a fraction ^ y of the popula-
tion is in favor. We call this the optimal outcome. The referendum design is broadened by
also allowing for a quali¯ed majority among the referendum participants. Let the quali¯ed
majority µ denote the required fraction of participating voters in favor of the non-default
outcome. De¯ne q¤ = ^ yY +(1¡ ^ y)N and µ¤ = ^ yY=q¤. The following proposition considers
simple-hearted voters, analogue results hold for calculating or a®ectionate voters.
Proposition 8. (Intensities of Voters' Preferences)
Assume that ° = 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2; ®
2).
i) When ¹ my = ¹ mn, the optimal outcome is only achieved in the unique equilibrium of the
referendum with a required majority of µ¤, a quorum of at most q¤ and default outcome
D 2 fA;Rg.
ii) When ¹ my 6= ¹ mn, the optimal outcome is only achieved in the unique equilibrium of a
referendum with either a quali¯ed majority of at most µ¤ and quorum q¤ or a referendum
with quali¯ed majority µ¤ and a quorum of at most q¤. In both cases the default outcome
is D = R if ¹ my > ¹ mn and D = A otherwise.
Statement i) follows by noting that µ¤ = ^ y and that the participation rate equals q¤.
Statement ii) follows by noting that the participation constraint or the (quali¯ed) majority
constraint (or both) should be exactly binding when a fraction ^ y of the population is inFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 29
favor. A su±ciently low quorum or quali¯ed majority is always met when the other
constraint is satis¯ed.
Note that in the paper the required majority among referendum participants is set at
50%. Although allowing for a quali¯ed majority would introduce other referendum designs
with the same outcome, focussing on a majority of 50% is the most neutral from a political
point of view.
Appendix B. A Non-Optimal Quorum when ° 6= 0
First consider the model with calculating voters, so ° < 0. De¯ne ^ p as the probability for
which the propensities to vote of yes-voters and no-voters are equal. Using the de¯nitions
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The uniform distribution of the moral pressures has the convenient property that the
sum of the propensities to vote s is constant
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When only the majority constraint is binding, the equilibrium condition pm ¡ Á(y ¡
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Similarly, when both conditions are binding, the equilibrium condition p ¡ Á((q ¡































The equilibrium probabilities are related to the quorum in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. (Calculating Voters and a Not-Optimally Set Quorum)
Suppose ° < 0 with 1 +
Á°
®s > 0.FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 30
i) Suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and
N(1)











s · q · yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0);
0 if yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0) · q:
ii) Suppose ¹ my < ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and N(0) < Y (0). Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
pm if q · yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm);
p+




2s · q · yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0);
0 if yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0) · q:
The proposition requires ° > ¡®s=Á. The ¯rst statement assumes that the quorum is
correctly set. This case is depicted in Figure 3. The condition N(1)=s > y implies that
pm < 1. Similar to the model with simple-hearted voters, pm > » (this is made formal in
the proof of the proposition). The second statement assumes that the default outcome is
incorrectly set. Although the equilibrium probability pm is positive, it is below ».
Now consider the model with a®ectionate voters, ° > 0. The only candidates for the
equilibrium probabilities are again pm, p§
q and p§
b . Before stating the proposition that




















From the de¯nition of p§
q it can be seen that p+
q and p¡
q only exist for q · qq. Similarly,
p+
b and p¡
b only exist for q ¸ qb.
Proposition 10. (A®ectionate Voters and a Not-Optimally Set Quorum)
Suppose ° > 0 with 1 ¡
Á°
®s > 0.
i) Suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and Y (0) < N(0). Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
1 if
N(1)
s · y and q · yY (1) + (1 ¡ y)N(1);
pm if
N(1)






s · y and yY (1) + (1 ¡ y)N(1) · q · qq;
or if
N(1)
s ¸ y and
2N(pm)Y (pm)
s · q · qq;
p¡
q if 1
2s < q · qq;
p+
b if 1 ¡ 2
Á°
®s ¸ 0 and qb · q < 1
2s;
or if 1 ¡ 2
Á°
®s · 0 and
2Y (0)N(0)
s · q < 1
2s;
p¡
b if 1 ¡ 2
Á°
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ii) Suppose ¹ my < ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and
N(0)
s < y. Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
pm if q · yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm);
p+
b if Y (») ¡ N(») ¸ ¡2
°
®»
and qb · q · yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm);
p¡
b if Y (») ¡ N(») ¸ ¡2
°
®» and qb · q ·
2Y (0)N(0)
s ;
or if Y (») ¡ N(») · ¡2
°
®»






The proposition requires ° < ®s=Á. The ¯rst statement assumes that the default
outcome is correctly set. This case is depicted in Figure 3. The condition Y (0) < N(0)
excludes the case where yes-voters have always the highest propensity to vote. When
N(1)=s < y, the majority constraint is always satis¯ed for a low quorum. Otherwise
the equilibrium probability pm is below 1 though above ». For both cases, the quorum
constraint becomes binding when the q increases. There are two possible equilibria, p+
q
and p¡
q . A necessary condition for their existence is Y > N, so they should be higher
than ^ p. They should be lower than pm, since equilibria with a higher probability are not
possible. It follows that p+
q exists from the point where it equals minf1;pmg until qq,
while p¡
q exists when the quorum is higher than 1
2s but at most qq. When the probability
of acceptance is below ^ p, it follows that Y < N. This shows that both constraints are
binding. The equilibrium with p+
b exists until 1
2s, since it then equals ^ p. When it starts
from p+
b = 0, the p¡
b equilibrium does not exist. When p+
b exists from qb onwards, p+
b > 0
and the p¡
b equilibrium exists between qb and 2Y (0)N(0)=s. For a higher quorum the
equilibrium with P[A] = 0 exists.
The second statement assumes that the default outcome is incorrectly set. Similar to
the simple-hearted voters, pm is below ». There exists a range with three equilibria when
° is not too small.
When pressure groups can a®ect the turnout of voters, the equilibria are found by using
Propositions 9 and 10 and rearranging the conditions.
Appendix C. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
This proposition is proved in the main text. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume that ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») (the proof of statement ii) with ¹ my < ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»)
follows in the same way). An equilibrium is characterized by p¡P[A] = 0 and the analysis
can be con¯ned to p 2 [0;1]. Note that Y (p) = 1
2 + (¹ my + °p)=® is strictly decreasing inFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 32
p and N(p) = 1
2 + (¹ mn + ° ¡ °p)=® strictly increasing. The participation rate equals
yY (p) + (1 ¡ y)N(p) = 1 +
y(¹ my + °p) + (1 ¡ y)(¹ mn + ° ¡ °p)
®
:
The ¯rst step is to determine the quorum values for which the population majority
outcome can occur. When the proposal should be accepted if and only if y ¸ 0, it
follows that P[A] = ». When ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»), so that Y (») > N(»), there is
already a majority of yes-voters for y < 1
2. To ensure that the proposal is only accepted
for y ¸ 1
2, the quorum constraint should be exactly binding for y = 1
2. This implies
that the quorum should be q¤ = 1
2Y (») + 1
2N(»). When ¹ my = ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»), so that
Y (») = N(»), the fractions of participating voters in favor and against are identical to
the population fraction. Any quorum below q¤ is always met and the majority constraint
correctly determines the outcome.
The second step is to establish that only the population majority outcome can occur
for the found quorum values. Suppose ¯rst that the quorum is q¤.
When Y (p) > N(p) the participation rate is increasing in y. Since for y = 1
2 it equals
q¤, the quorum constraint is only met when y ¸ 1
2. Since in this case also the majority
constraint is met, the probability of accepting the proposal is ».
When Y (p) = N(p) the participation rate is constant and equal to q¤. The fractions
of participating voters in favor and against are identical to the population fractions. The
quorum is always met and the majority constraint only when y ¸ 1
2, so P[A] = 1
2.
When Y (p) < N(p) the participation rate is decreasing in y. Since for y = 1
2 it equals
q¤, this means that the quorum constraint can only be met for y < 1
2. However, for these
cases the majority constraint is violated and P[A] = 0.
To summarize p ¡ P[A] = p ¡ » 1 1fY (p)¸N(p)g (see also Figure 1). Remember that Y is
decreasing in p while N is increasing and that Y (0) ¸ N(0), hence any solution p¤ of
p ¡ P[A] = 0 thus satis¯es Y (p¤) ¸ N(p¤). Since p ¡ P[A] is strictly increasing on [0;1],
any solution is necessarily unique. The claim in statement i) now follows by noting that
p¤ = » is a solution with Y (p¤) = N(p¤). The claim in statement ii) follows by noting
that p¤ = » is a solution with Y (p¤) > N(p¤).
Now suppose that Y (») = N(») and that the quorum is below q¤. Since Y (p) > N(p)
for p < », the quorum will be met for y < 1
2 and P[A] > 1
2. This shows that p ¡ P[A] < 0
for p < ». Likewise it follows that p ¡ P[A] > 0 for p > ». The equilibrium found above is
thus unique. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.
Assume that ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») (the proof with ¹ my < ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») follows in the
same way). In the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2, the quorum values for which
the population majority outcome occur are found. It an identical way it also follows that
p ¡ P[A] = p ¡ » 1 1fY (p)¸N(p)g. However, now Y is increasing in p while N is decreasingFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 33
(see also Figure 2). The proof of statement i) follows by noting that p¤ = » is a solution
with Y (p¤) = N(p¤) when ¹ my = ¹ mn+°(1¡2»), and a solution with Y (p¤) > N(p¤) when
¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»).
The proof of statement ii) follows by noting that since p ¡ P[A] is strictly increasing
for p such that Y (p) ¸ N(p), any other equilibrium should satisfy Y (p) < N(p). But for
these p the probability of acceptance P[A] is zero, so that p ¡ P[A] = p. This shows that
p = 0 is the only candidate for a solution. This is only possible if Y (0) < N(0), so if
Y (0) ¡ N(0) = (¹ my ¡ ¹ mn ¡ °)=® < 0. This gives the condition for uniqueness. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.
In equilibrium p = P[A] for all voters. The propensity to vote of a yes-voter i with parame-
ters (¹ mi;®i;°i) is 1
2+(¹ mi+°ip)=®i, which follows from the assumption that (¹ mi;®i;°i) 2 ^ P.












+ ¹ my + °p:
Similarly, N = 1
2 + ¹ mn+°¡°p. The proofs of Propositions 1-3 go through with the found
expressions for Y and N when ® is taken to be 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5.
i) In this case Y ¸ N. First consider Y > N. When the quorum is su±ciently small,
the probability of acceptance is determined by the majority constraint. Since N=s < 1
2
and by assumption N=s > y, it follows that pm 2 (0;1). The majority constraint and the
quorum constraint coincide for q = 2Y N=s. The quorum constraint is the only binding
constraint until it can never be satis¯ed, so until q = yY +(1¡y)N. For a higher quorum
the probability of acceptance is 0. Now consider Y = N. This implies that pm = ». The
quorum is always satis¯ed as long as q · Y = N = 1
2s. A higher quorum can never be
satis¯ed.
ii) In this case Y < N. Since N=s > 1
2 and by assumption N=s < y, it follows that
pm 2 (0;1). When the quorum is so low that it is always satis¯ed, i.e. below yY +(1¡y)N,
the probability of acceptance is determined by the majority constraint. When q increases,
both constraints are binding until the majority and the quorum constraint can not be
simultaneously met. This happens when (q ¡ N)=(Y ¡ N) = N=s, which is identical to
q = 2Y N=s. For a higher quorum the probability of acceptance is 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6.
The proof follows by similar reasoning as the proof of Proposition 5. The only technical
detail is that for N · 1
2q a proportion y that satis¯es the quorum constraint also satis¯es
the majority constraint. Clearly (1¡y)N · 1
2(1¡y)q. That 1
2(1¡y)q · yY follows from
q · yY +(1¡y)N · yY + 1
2(1¡y)q · yY + 1
2(1¡y)q+yq and moving all terms involving
q to the left hand side. ¤FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 34
Proof of Proposition 7.
The arguments of the proof are similar to previous ones. In case Y ¸ q, pm < 1 if N=s > y
for N = qY=(2Y ¡ q). This is implied by Y > 1
2q=y.
When Y < 1
2q, the majority constraint and the quorum constraint cannot be met
simultaneously. It is clear that yY · 1
2yq. That 1
2yq · (1 ¡ y)N follows from q ·
yY + (1 ¡ y)N < 1
2yq + (1 ¡ y)N · 1
2yq + (1 ¡ y)q + (1 ¡ y)N and moving all terms
involving q to the left hand side. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8.
This proposition is proved in the text. ¤
Proof of Proposition 9.
In proving the proposition, the following relations between ^ p, » and pm are used
^ p ¡ » = ¡
¹ my ¡ ¹ mn ¡ °(1 ¡ 2»)
2°
;
pm ¡ ^ p =





pm ¡ » =






i) First consider ¹ my > ¹ mn+°(1¡2»)0. The derived relations above show that ^ p > pm > »,
so Y (pm) > N(pm) and Y (») > N(»). Note that no equilibria with p¤ > pm can occur.
The condition that N(1)=s ¸ y guarantees that pm < 1. The majority constraint is the
only binding constraint until it crosses with the quorum constraint, which happens for
q = 2Y (pm)N(pm)=s. When the quorum constraint takes over, it does so until it can
never be satis¯ed, which happens for q = yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0). When 1
2(^ p + ») > pm
it is clear that p+
q cannot be an equilibrium. That this is the case follows by using
1
2(^ p + ») ¡ pm = 1
2(^ p ¡ pm) + 1
2(» ¡ pm) and the derived relations above so that
1
2
(^ p + ») ¡ pm = ¡
1
4°










When the quorum is above yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0), the quorum constraint can never be
satis¯ed and p¤ = 0.
Now suppose ¹ my = ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»). Then ^ p = pm = », and 2Y (pm)N(pm)=s = 1
2s. So,
p¤ = » for q · 1
2s. Since 1
2(^ p + ») ¡ pm = 0, the equilibrium with p+
q does not exist for a
higher quorum. The equilibrium probability is p¡
q until q is raised so high that it becomes
0.
ii) The relations derived above show that » > pm > ^ p, so Y (pm) < N(pm) and Y (») <
N(»). The condition N(0) < Y (0) implies ^ p > 0 so that pm > 0. When the quorum
constraint is su±ciently small p¤ = pm is the equilibrium. The quorum constraint becomes
binding when (q ¡N(pm))=(Y (pm)¡N(pm)) = y. Since ((1¡2Á°=®s)=(2¡2Á°=®s))^ p <FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 35
^ p < pm it is clear that p+
b is the equilibrium that takes over from pm and that p¡
b does
not exist. For q = 1
2s, it holds that q = 1
2s2=s and thus 1
2(Á®=°)(q ¡ 2Y (0)N(0)=s) =
1
2(Á®=°s)(1
2(Y (0) + N(0))2 ¡ 2Y (0)N(0)) = 1
4(Á®=°s)(Y (0) ¡ N(0))2 = (Á°=®s)^ p2. The
value of p+
























































































^ p = ^ p:
Since ^ p = 1
2(®=°)(N(0) ¡ Y (0)) > 0 the p+
b equilibrium exists when q · 1
2s. For a
higher quorum Y > N and the quorum constraint is the only binding constraint. Since
1
2(^ p + ») > ^ p, only p¡
q can be an equilibrium. To ¯nd p¡
q in q = 1
2s, ¯rst rewrite q = 1
2s =
¡1
2(N(0)¡Y (0))+N(0) = ¡(N(0)¡Y (0))(y ¡»=Á)+N(0), then 1
2(Á®=°)(yY (0)+(1¡
y)N(0) ¡ q) = ¡1
2(®=°)(N(0) ¡ Y (0))» = ¡^ p» so that
1
2

















(^ p + »)2 ¡ ^ p» =
1
2
(^ p + ») ¡
1
2
(» ¡ ^ p) = ^ p:
The p¡
q equilibrium exists until the quorum can never be satis¯ed, which is the case for
q = yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0). For a higher quorum p¤ = 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 10.
From 2N(0)Y (0)=s · 2(1
2s1
2s)=s = 1
2s it follows that qb < 1




(^ p + »)2 =
°
2Á®






(^ p ¡ »)2 +
¡






so that qq = 1
2(°=Á®)(^ p¡»)2 + 1
2(Y (0)+N(0)) ¸ 1
2s. The inequality is strict when ^ p 6= »,
so when ¹ my 6= ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»).
i) First consider ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»). The relations derived at the beginning of the
previous proof show that pm > » > ^ p, so that Y (pm) > N(pm) and Y (») > N(»).
When N(1)=s · y, the majority constraint is always satis¯ed and the equilibrium
probability is 1 until the quorum constraint is crossed for the quorum yY (1)+(1¡y)N(0).
When N(1)=s ¸ y it follows that pm < 1. The majority constraint is binding until
(q ¡ N(pm))=(Y (pm) ¡ N(pm)) = N(pm)=s, which is the stated condition. When the
quorum constraint becomes binding p+
q is the equilibrium since 1
2(^ p+») < pm implies that
p¡
q only exists for lower probabilities then 1
2(^ p+»). So, p+
q stops to exist at qq. Note thatFIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION 36
for this quorum the minimum of p+
q is achieved which equals 1
2(^ p+»). Since this is bigger
than ^ p, indeed Y > N. By assumption N(0) > Y (0) so that ^ p > 0 and p+
q exists until qq.
From here p¡
q decreases when q decreases. In the previous proof it was shown that p¡
q = ^ p
for q = 1
2s. This shows that Y > N so that p¡
q exists for q > 1
2s.
Note that the equilibrium p¤ = ^ p does not exist! The only quorum candidate would be
q = 1
2s. But for this quorum Y (^ p) = N(^ p) = 1
2s, so the quorum is always met. But, if
only the quorum constraint binds, pm is the only equilibrium candidate, but pm > ^ p.
When the quorum decreases from 1
2s, both constraints are binding. When p < ^ p it
follows that Y < N, hence only p+
b and p¡
b are equilibrium candidates. In the previous
proof it was shown that p+
b = ^ p for q = 1
2s, so that Y < N. The minimum value of
p+
b is attained in qb and equals ((1 ¡ 2Á°=®s)=(2 ¡ 2Á°=®s))^ p. The equilibrium with
p+
b does not exist on the whole interval from qb to 1
2s if 1 ¡ 2Á°=®s < 0. In this case
it only exists when q > 2Y (0)N(0)=s. When it does exists on the whole interval, p¡
b
exists from qb to N(0)Y (0)=s. In both cases, p¤ = 0 when q is so big that the majority
constraint and the quorum constraint cannot be satis¯ed simultaneously. This is the case
for q ¸ 2Y (0)N(0)=s.
Now consider ¹ my = ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»). The relations derived in the previous proof show
that ^ p = » = pm. Note also that 2N(pm)Y (pm)=s = qq = 1
2s (see the expression for qq
derived at the beginning of this proof), so the p§
q part does not exist. Note also that
qb < 1
2s, which shows that the p¡
b arm does exist.
ii) The relations derived in the previous proof show that ^ p > » > pm, so that Y (pm) <
N(pm) and Y (») < N(»).
Since by assumption N(0)=s < y, it follows that pm > 0. This is the only equilib-
rium until the quorum constraint becomes binding in q = yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm). The
equilibrium with p¤ = p+





























^ p ¡ » < 0:
When this is the case, the p¤
b equilibrium exists from qb until yY (pm)+(1¡y)N(pm). Note
that p+
b > 0 since ^ p > 0. When the p+
b equilibrium exists, the p¡
b equilibrium takes over
from qb, otherwise directly from yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm). It exists until p¡
b is zero, which
happens at 2Y (0)N(0)=s. For a higher quorum the majority and the quorum constraint
are mutually exclusive and p¤ = 0. ¤